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PAST PERSECUTION STANDARD FOR ASYLUM
ELIGIBILITY IN THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT: BYGONES
ARE BYGONES
INTRODUCTION
Give me your tired, your poor, [y]our huddled masses yearning to breathe
free, [t]he wretched refuse of your teeming shore. Send these, the homeless,
tempest-tost to me, I lite my lamp beside the golden door.'
So beckons the lady who keeps watch at New York Harbor, the
symbolic gateway to the United States. Since its inception, the
United States has been viewed by its residents, as well as by count-
less peoples around the world, as the land of opportunity. For many,
the opportunity perceived here has not been merely an opportunity
to prosper economically, but, more significantly, an opportunity to
escape harsh treatment at home.
With the accession of the United States to the United Nations's
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees ("Protocol") 2 and
with the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980 ("Refugee Act"),'
those persecuted at home because of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a social group, or political opinion have had reason
to seek freedom from oppression at home by pursuing asylum in the
United States. Where the conditions in their countries have
changed, however, so that they are no longer able to establish the
likelihood of continued persecution, the opportunity to escape their
troubled past has, in U.S. courts, proven illusory."
This Comment will discuss cases from the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit and from other federal circuit courts involving
asylum claims based on past persecution and changed conditions,
1. Emma Lazarus, The New Colossus: Inscription for the Statute of Liberty, New York Har-
bor (1883).
2. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, January 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6224 [hereinafter
Protocol]; see infra notes 53-57 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history of the
Protocol).
3. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.).
4. See infra notes 119-239 and accompanying text (discussing court decisions denying asylum
claims based on past persecution and involving changed conditions).
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and will establish that the decisions in those cases are contrary to
the results contemplated by the United Nations and by Congress.
This Comment is divided into three substantive sections. The Back-
ground begins with an outline of the asylum process in the United
States, and then explores the eligibility requirements for a grant of
asylum, including a historical overview of the definition of a refu-
gee, 5 a definition of persecution, and comments on the discretionary
nature of asylum.
The next substantive section discusses the effect a change in an
alien's country of origin has on his asylum eligibility. This section
first sets forth both the United Nations's and the United States's
positions on an alien's asylum eligibility in light of changed condi-
tions in his country of origin. A discussion comparing both positions
shows them to be identical in substance. To illustrate the similarity
between the two positions with respect to an alien's asylum eligibil-
ity, subsequent to a change of conditions in his country of origin, the
section also examines the administIative decision in In re Chen,6
where an alien received asylum despite changed conditions in his
country. Finally, the section reviews recent Seventh Circuit deci-
sions involving asylum claims based on past persecution, and notes
the positions of other circuits which have considered the issue of
past persecution asylum eligibility in light of changed conditions.
The Analysis contrasts recent decisions by the Seventh Circuit
and other federal circuits with the holding in Chen,7 and shows
these decisions to be at odds with the international and domestic
instruments governing asylum eligibility. In conclusion, the Analysis
highlights the negative effects of the prevailing position on asylum
eligibility based on past persecution, with regard to both aliens who
have suffered persecution but were found ineligible for asylum in the
United States and to the international stature of the United States.
5. Throughout this Comment, as in the Protocol, the Refugee Act, and administrative and judi-
cial opinions, labels such as "alien," "asylum-seeker," and "refugee" are used. It is important to
keep in mind that behind these labels are men, women, and children who have lived through
severe physical abuse and mistreatment in their home countries.
6. Interim Dec. No. 3104 (BIA Apr. 25, 1989).
7. Id.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Asylum Process in the United States
Asylum serves as a humanitarian response to persons who are, by
definition, unable or unwilling to turn to their own governments for
protection from persecution.' In the United States, statutory recog-
nition of asylum first appeared in 1980 with the passage of the Ref-
ugee Act.' Today, the Refugee Act' ° and the federal regulations
promulgated under it govern the asylum process in the United
States. The Refugee Act is a part of the federal immigration stat-
ute, the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA")," and is admin-
istered by the Attorney General of the United States."
Section 208 of the INA authorizes the Attorney General to estab-
lish an asylum application procedure for an asylum-seeking alien
present in the United States.'3 The procedure promulgated by the
Attorney General under the authority of Section 208 directs an asy-
lum-seeking alien to file an asylum application with either an Asy-
lum Office, District Director, or Immigration Judge, depending on
the circumstances.' 4
When the alien submits the application for asylum to a District
Director, either directly or through an Asylum Office, the District
8. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY 819 (1992); see infra notes 46-61
and accompanying text (discussing the refugee definition).
9. See LEGOMSKY, supra note 8, at 840 ("In 1974 the Justice Department issued regulations
providing asylum criteria and procedures ...but not until 1980 did asylum receive statutory
recognition.").
10. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.).
11. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525
(1988 & Supp. 11 1990)).
12..For practical purposes, the Attorney General delegates the administration of the INA to
the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") pursuant to federal regulations. THOMAS A.
ALEINIKOFF & DAVID A. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND POLICY 101-02 (2d interim ed.,
1991). The INS is a federal governmental agency established within the Department of Justice.
13 U.S.C. § 1551 (1988). The INS divides the United States into four geographical regions:
eastern, western, northern, and southern. An INS Regional Commissioner is responsible for each
of the four regions, and each region is divided into various districts and is managed by a District
Director. BILL 0. HING, HANDLING IMMIGRATION CASES 16 (1985) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 100.4
(1973)).
13. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988).
14. 8 C.F.R. § 208.4 (1990). These regulations prescribe the appropriate recipient of the asy-
lum, depending on the procedural position of the alien at the time of application. For example, a
different application procedure is prescribed for an alien making an affirmative application than
for an alien who applies during exclusion or deportation proceedings. Id.
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Director will review the asylum application for merit. 15 As part of
the merit review, the District Director is required to request an ad-
visory opinion from the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian
Affairs of the State Department ("BHRHA").16 At its own option,
the BHRHA may comment on the current conditions in the alien's
country of origin, provide an assessment of the alien's likely treat-
ment were he to return to his country of origin, and, in general,
provide whatever information it deems helpful in deciding whether
to grant asylum in a particular case. 17 If the District Director finds
that the alien is eligible for a grant of asylum,18 he then may, at his
discretion, grant or deny asylum to the alien.1" The District Direc-
15. Richard K. Preston, Asylum Adjudications: Do State Department Advisory Opinions Vio-
late Refugees' Rights and U.S. International Obligations?. 45 MD. L. REV. 91, 108 (1986) (citing
I.N.S. Operations Instruction § 208.9(d) (1980), reprinted in 4 IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCE-
DURE. § 23-156.17 (C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield eds., 1984)).
16. Preston, supra note 15, at 108. At the BHRHA, the process is as follows:
Each application is reviewed individually by an officer in the.Office of Asylum Affairs
of [the BHR]HA and then is sent to the appropriate country desk officer in the De-
partment. If appropriate, [the BHR]HA may request an opinion from the Office of
the Legal Adviser or information from the U.S. Embassy in the applicant's country of
nationality, or, if appropriate, in a third country. After agreement is reached between
the asylum officer in [the BHR]HA and the desk officer on the proposed recommen-
dation to INS, the draft advisory opinion and application file are reviewed by the
Director of the Office of Asylum Affairs in [the BHR]HA, and in some cases by the
geographic officer in [the BHR]HA or by the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asylum
and Humanitarian Affairs. It is rare for individual cases to rise to more senior levels.
The proposed recommendation is then signed by the Director of the Office of Asylum
Affairs and sent to INS.
Id. at 109 (alterations in original) (citing Refugee Assistance: Hearings on H.R. 3195 Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees and Int'l. Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 55-56 (1983) (prepared statement of Elliott Abrams, Assistant Secretary, Bureau
of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State)).
17. 8 C.F.R. § 208.11 (1990).
18. See infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text (discussing asylum eligibility grounds).
19. 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(a) (1990); see also infra notes 70-78 and accompanying text (discussing
in detail the discretionary nature of asylum); In re Pula, Interim Dec. No. 3033 (BIA Sept. 22,
1987) (listing the factors to be considered in the exercise of discretion with respect to a grant of
asylum). In Pula, the BIA stated:
[Tihe totality of circumstances and actions of an alien in his flight from the country
where he fears persecution should be examined. . . . Among those factors which
should be considered are whether the alien passed through any other countries or
arrived in the United States directly from his country, whether orderly refugee proce-
dures were in fact available to help him in any country he passed through, and
whether he made any attempts to seek asylum before coming to the United States. In
addition, the length of time the alien remained in a third country, and his living con-
ditions, safety, and potential for long-term residency there are also relevant. . . . Fur-
ther, whether the alien has relatives legally in the United States or other personal ties
to this country which motivated him to seek asylum here rather than elsewhere is
another factor to consider. . . . Moreover, if the alien engaged in fraud to circumvent
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tor's decision to grant or deny asylum is not subject to appeal, other
than in connection with any subsequent exclusion or deportation
proceedings against the alien.2 0
When an alien first applies for asylum during exclusion or depor-
tation proceedings, he submits the asylum application to the office of
the Immigration Judge who has jurisdiction over his case. 1 Upon
receipt of the asylum application, the Immigration Judge is required
to seek a BHRHA advisory opinion pursuant to Section 208.11 of
Chapter 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations.2 Either the alien or
the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS"), on behalf of
the government, may appeal the Immigration Judge's decision as to
asylum to the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"). 3
The BIA is a part of the Executive Office for Immigration Review
("EOIR"),24 which is an administrative body contained within the
Department of Justice.25 The EOIR has two divisions: trial and ap-
pellate. 6 The immigration courts administered by the Immigration
Judges are the EOIR's trial courts, while the BIA is its appellate
branch. 7 The BIA, like the immigration courts, is not a court estab-
lished by Article I or Article III of the United States Constitution,28
orderly refugee procedures, the seriousness of the fraud should be considered ...
[G]eneral humanitarian considerations, such as an alien's tender age or poor health,
may also be relevant in a discretionary determination.
Id. at 17. The BIA further noted that "the alien should present evidence on any relevant factors
which he believes support the favorable exercise of discretion in his case. In the absence of any
adverse factors, however, asylum should be granted in the exercise of discretion." Id. at 18 (em-
phasis added); see also DEBORAH E. ANKER, THE LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 165-
71 (2d ed. 1991) [hereinafter ANKER, THE LAW OF ASYLUM] (offering a thorough treatment of
asylum as a discretionary grant and commenting on the factors stated in Pula).
20. 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(b) (1990). Exclusion and deportation proceedings are administrative
proceedings that the INS may bring against aliens to prevent them from entering the United
States in the case of exclusion, or, in the case of deportation, to remove them from the United
States. See HING, supra note 12, §§ 7.1-9.33 (discussing exclusion and deportation proceedings).
21. 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(c) (1990).
22. Id. § 242.17(c)(3); see also supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text (discussing the
BHRHA's role in asylum claims).
23. Id. § 242.21(a).
24. HING, supra note 12, at 17. BIA precedential decisions are of binding authority for Immi-
gration Judges except in jurisdictions where a federal court has ruled on an issue differently from
the BIA. In such cases, the Immigration Judges are bound by the federal court's ruling. ANKER,
THE LAW OF ASYLUM, supra note 19, at 14. The BIA does not review challenges as to the validity
of regulations or the constitutionality of statutes. Id. at 15.
25. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a)(1) (1991) (discussing organization of the Office within the Department
of Justice).




but rather is a quasi-judicial body established by federal regula-
tion.29 If the BIA affirms the decision to deny asylum and affirms or
enters a final order of deportation against an alien, the alien may
appeal to a federal court by petitioning for review.30 The review at
the federal court level, however, requires the support of reasonable,
substantial, and probative evidence, and is based solely on the ad-
ministrative record upon which the BIA entered the deportation or-
der. a" The court is limited to a review of alleged errors of law, pro-
cedure, or the record to determine whether the BIA decision was
arbitrary or capricious.3 2
If an alien succeeds in obtaining asylum, he may remain in the
United States for one year.3 3 At the end of the one-year period, the
INS examines the alien for admission to the United States as an
immigrant.3 4 Unless the alien's status as a refugee has been termi-
nated within the one-year period due, for example, to changes in the
alien's country of origin, 5 the alien is eligible for an adjustment of
status from refugee to lawful permanent resident.3 6 As a lawful per-
29. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1 (1991) (establishing organization of BIA).
30. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a), (b) (1988 & Supp. II 1990). The petition for review must be filed
within ninety days of the date of the BIA's final order of deportation unless the petitioner has
been convicted of an aggravated felony, in which case the petition for review must be filed within
thirty days of the final order. Id. § 1105a(a)(I) (Supp. 11 1990); see also Preston, supra note 15,
at Ill (discussing asylum adjudication procedure); John F. Weber, The Law of Asylum in the
U.S., in SALVADORAN AND GUATEMALAN ASYLUM CASES: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO REPRE-
SENTING CLIENTS IN DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS (1985), reprinted in IMMIGRATION AND NA-
TIONALITY LAW, 39TH SYMPOSIUM OF THE AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASSOCIATION 923
(Robert E. Juceam ed., 1985) (discussing the appeal process in asylum cases).
31. 8 U.S.C. § II 05a(a)(4) (1988); see also Preston, supra note 15, at III (discussing federal
court review of immigration orders).
32. Preston, supra note 15, at Ill.
33. Joni L. Andrioff, Comment, Proving the Existence of Persecution in Asylum and With-
holding Claims, 62 CHi-KENT L. REV. 107, 111 (1985).
34. 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a) (1988). Applications for adjustment of status are reviewed by a district
director of the INS, regardless of whether the INS or an Immigration Judge granted the asylum.
ANKER, THE LAW OF ASYLUM. supra note 19, at 65.
35. 8 U.S.C. § II 58(b) (1988). Other grounds for revocation of asylum are fraud in the alien's
application for asylum or the occurrence of one of the specific circumstances listed in
§ 208.14(c)(I)-(3) of Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations. 8 C.F.R. § 208.24(a) (1990).
The specific circumstances listed in § 208.14(c) are: (1) Where the alien was convicted of a "par-
ticularly serious crime in the United States, [and] constitutes a danger to the community;" (2)
Where the alien had entered another nation prior to arriving in the United States and received an
offer of some type of permanent resettlement from that nation; or (3) Where the alien is regarded
as "a danger to the security of the United States." 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(c)(I)-(3) (1990).
36. 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a)(2) (1988). In order to effectuate the adjustment of status to lawful
permanent resident, an alien must apply for the adjustment and meet specific requirements. 8
C.F.R. § 209.2(a) (1991). The regulation requires that an alien must be physically present in the
United States for at least one year after receiving asylum, continue to be a refugee within the
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manent resident, an alien enjoys the privilege of remaining in the
United States and .qualifying for naturalization. 7
If, however, an alien fails to secure asylum or if his asylum is
revoked for any reason,38 the INS may bring exclusion or deporta-
tion proceedings against him. 9 Once the exclusion or deportation
proceedings against an alien have begun, he may reassert his asylum
claim,4" satisfy the standards for withholding of deportation,4' or
face a return to his country of origin. 2 The following section ex-
plores circumstances under which an alien is eligible for asylum.
meaning of the Refugee Act, be admissible as an immigrant at the time of the application for
adjustment, and not be firmly resettled in another country. Id; see also ANKER, THE LAW OF
ASYLUM, supra note 19, at 64 (discussing the regulatory requirements for adjustment of status).
37. Weber, supra note 30, at 924. Only a person lawfully admitted for permanent residence in
the United States qualifies for naturalization. 8 U.S.C. § 1429 (1988).
38. Asylum may be revoked if the INS establishes any of the following:
(1) The alien no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution upon return due to a
change of conditions in the alien's country of nationality or habitual residence; (2)
There is a showing of fraud in the alien's application such that he was not eligible for
asylum at the time it was granted; or (3) The alien has committed any act that would
have been grounds for denial of asylum under ["mandatory denials" listed in 8 C.F.R.
208.14(c)(i)-(3) (1990)].
8 C.F.R. § 208.24(a) (1990); see also ANKER, THE LAW OF ASYLUM, supra note 19, at 65-68
(discussing revocation of asylum in detail).
Grounds for mandatory denial of asylum are invoked if an alien, "having been convicted by a
final judgment of a particularly serious crime in the United States, constitutes a danger to the
community," is a danger to the security of the United States, or has been firmly resettled within
the meaning of the regulations. 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(c) (1990).
39. 8 C.F.R. § 208.22(b) (1990).
40. Id. § 208.24(e) (1990).
41. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1988). Note that for asylum eligibility, § 208(a) of the Refugee Act
requires only a showing that the alien qualifies as a refugee under the Act, but for the withholding
of deportation, § 243(h) of the Refugee Act requires a determination that the "alien's life or
freedom would be threatened in . . . [his country of origin] on account of race, religion, national-
ity, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat.
105, 107 (1980) (codified as amended in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158, 1253(h)(1) (1988)). In general, the
satisfaction of the standard for the withholding of deportation under § 243(h) of the Refugee Act
is considered more difficult than the showing of eligibility for asylum under § 208(a) of the Refu-
gee Act. See I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1986) (surveying the different standards
at issue in a deportation action and an asylum action); IRA J. KURZBAN, IMMIGRATION LAW
SOURCEBOOK 216 (3d ed. 1992) (noting that courts require "more objective and corroborative
evidence" in a § 243(h) withholding of deportation action than in a § 208(a) asylum action);
Andrioff, supra note 33, at 113-15 (discussing deportation and the comparison of standards of
proof under §§ 208(a) and 243(h) of the Act - §§ 1158(a) and 1253(h) of the INA,
respectively).
42. Weber, supra note 30, at 895; see generally Wendy L. Fink, Note, Joseph Doherty and the
INS: A Long Way to International Justice, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 927 (1992) (discussing the re-
lated but separate topic of non-refoulment, the right of a refugee not to be returned to a country
where he or she may face persecution).
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B. Statutory Background
1. Eligibility for a Grant of Asylum
An alien is eligible for a discretionary grant of asylum if the At-
torney General, or a person to whom the Attorney General has dele-
gated such authority, determines that the alien is a refugee within
the scope of the definition provided in the Refugee Act.43 Conse-
quently, two phenomena must occur in order for an alien to receive
asylum in the United States: the alien must qualify as a refugee
under the Refugee Act,44 and the Attorney General must exercise
his discretion."'
2. Definition of a Refugee
The definition of a refugee set forth in the Refugee Act derives
from a United Nations convention regarding the status of refu-
gees.46 By a 1950 resolution, the General Assembly of the United
Nations created the Office of the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees ("High Commissioner"). 7 The General Assem-
bly mandated that the High Commissioner follow directives given
by the General Assembly or the Economic and Social Council of the
United Nations.48 The Economic and Social Council then formed a
Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems ("Committee").
The efforts of this Committee culminated in a draft of the United
Nations's 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
("Convention").49 The United Nations subsequently adopted the
Convention, and numerous countries, excluding the United States,
have acceded to it.50 The Convention defined a refugee as a person
43. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988).
44. The Refugee Act defines a refugee at 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(42)(A) (1988); see also infra
notes 46-61 and accompanying text (discussing the definition of "refugee").
45. See In re Pula, Interim Dec. No. 3033 (BIA Sept. 22, 1987) (listing the factors to be
considered in deciding whether a discretionary grant of asylum should be made).
46. United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T.
6259 [hereinafter Convention].
47. See Resolutions Adopted on the Reports. of the Third Committee, G.A. Res. 428, U.N.
GAOR 3d Comm., 5th Sess., 325th mtg. (1950), reprinted in 3 UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS
120 (Dusan J. Djonovich ed., 1973) (creating the office of the High Commissioner for Refugees).
48. Id.; see also Guy S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 (1983)
(noting that the High Commissioner is required to follow policy directions of the General Assem-
bly and of the Economic and Social Council).
49. Convention, supra note 46.
50. Each country listed below signed both the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol unless
otherwise noted: "C" means that the country signed only the 1951 Convention, while "P" means
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who, "owing to [a] well-founded fear of being persecuted for rea-
sons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion," is unable or unwilling to return to his
country of origin." The Committee drafting the Convention ex-
plained that "well-founded fear" means that the person "has either
been actually a victim of persecution or can show good reason why
he fears persecution." 52
Realizing that the Convention applied only to those persons who
became refugees as a result of events occurring before July 1, 1951,
and wishing to provide equal status to all refugees covered by the
definition contained in the Convention, the United Nations adopted
the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees in 1967 ("Proto-
col")." The Protocol expressly adopted the definition of a refugee
contained in the Convention and eliminated the temporal provision
which made the Convention applicable only to those individuals who
became refugees essentially as a result of World War 11."'
Upon the advice and consent of the United States Senate,55 Presi-
that the country signed only the 1967 Protocol. As of February 1992, the following countries were
parties to the 1951 Convention and/or the 1967 Protocol: Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon,
Canada (P), Cape Verde (P), Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo,
Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Repub-
lic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon,
Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland,
Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein,
Luxembourg, Madagascar (C), Malawi, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique (C),
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea,
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa (C), Sao Tome and
Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland (P),
Sweden, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States (P), Uru-
guay, Venezuela (P), Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe. UNITED STATES COMMITTEE
FOR REFUGEES. WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 1992, AT 108.
51. Convention, supra note 46, at 6261.
52. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, U. N. ESCOR.
Ad Hoc Comm. on Statelessness and Related Problems, 4th Sess., 26th mtg., at 39, U.N. Docs.
E/1618, E/AC.32/5 (1950) (emphasis added). With respect to the suggestion that a well-founded
fear of being persecuted includes past persecution, "It bears emphasizing ... that at the time the
Convention came into effect, the majority of the refugees covered by the Convention were victims
of past persecution in Europe, which persecution clearly had ceased with the defeat of the Axis
powers." In re Chen, Interim Dec. No. 3104, at 19-20 (BIA Apr. 25, 1989) (Heilman, Board
Member, concurring).
53. Protocol, supra note 2.
54. See Convention, supra note 46, at 6225 (stating that "[for the purpose of the present
Protocol, the term 'refugee' shall ...mean any person within the definition of article I of the
Convention as if the words 'As a result of events occurring before I January 1951' and the words
.as a result of such events' in article IA(2) were omitted.").
55. The United States Senate ratified the Protocol on October 4, 1968, with 59 senators voting
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dent Lyndon Johnson approved the accession of the United States to
the Protocol on October 15, 1968.66 The Congressional Conference
on the Refugee Act of 1980 adopted the present statutory definition
of a refugee with the express understanding that the definition is
based on the definition used by the United Nations in the Protocol. 57
Consequently, the Refugee Act also defines a refugee as a person
who is unable or unwilling to return to his country of origin "be-
cause of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on ac-
count of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular so-
cial group, or political opinion . ... -"1 The United States Supreme
Court, in I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca,59 recognized that in adopting
the refugee definition, Congress sought to conform to the United
Nations's accord on refugees as embodied in the Protocol.8 0 The
United States's statutory definition of a refugee is thus consistent
with the definition adopted by the United Nations in the Convention
and subsequently in the Protocol. Both definitions thus contemplate
two distinct grounds upon which a person can be found to be a refu-
gee: past persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution.61
for, 0 voting against, and 41 senators not voting. 114 Cong. Rec. 29,607 (1968).
56. Protocol, supra note 2, at 6257.
57. JOINT STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE, S. REP. No. 590, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. -19 (1980); see also Deborah E. Anker & Michael H. Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A
Legislative History of the Refugee Act, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 60 (1981) (noting that the
conference committee adopted the United Nations's definition of a refugee); Arthur C. Helton,
I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca: The Decision and Its Implications, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 35, 44 (1987-88) ("Congress intended that the statutes dealing with refugees and asy-
lum, such as the Refugee Act, be interpreted and applied consistent with the Protocol.").
58. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1988).
59. 480 U.S. 421 (1986) (considering standards of proof for the withholding of deportation
under § 243(h) of the Refugee Act and for asylum under § 208(a) of the Refugee Act).
60. Id. at 437. The Court noted "Congress's intent that the new statutory definition of 'refugee'
be interpreted in conformity with the Protocol's definition. The Conference Committee Report, for
example, stated that the definition was accepted 'with the understanding that it is based directly
upon the language of the Protocol and it is intended that the provision be construed consistent
with the Protocol.'" Id. (citing JOINT STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE, S. REP.
No. 590, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1980)).
61. The dual standard of asylum eligibility, based on the definition of a refugee due to past
persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution, has received judicial and administrative
recognition. Both the courts and the BIA have recognized that past persecution is a distinct basis
upon which a person can be found to be a refugee within the meaning of the statute and thus be
eligible for a grant of asylum. For example, the United States Supreme Court in Cardoza-Fon-
seca noted that under the United Nations's accord on refugees, § 1158(a) of the INA, and
§ 208(a) of the Refugee Act, to be eligible for a grant of asylum an alien only has to show that he
is a refugee. Id. at 441. The refugee definition contained in the Refugee Act allows one to come
within its terms "because of persecution or a well founded fear of persecution" on account of one
or more of the specified grounds. 8 U.S.C. § I I01(a)(42)(A) (1988). The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals observed that "past persecution, without more, satisfies the requirement of
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3. Definition of Persecution
Congress failed to define the term persecution in the Refugee
Act. 6 2 Likewise, persecution is neither defined in the Convention nor
in the Protocol." In a United Nations handbook governing refugee
status and eligibility requirements, 4 the High Commissioner noted
that while there is no universal definition of persecution, "a threat to
life or freedom on account of race, religion, nationality, political
opinion or membership of a particular social group is always perse-
cution. Other serious violations of human rights for the same rea-
sons would also constitute persecution."65
In I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca,66 the United States Supreme Court
stated that while the explanations provided in the Handbook do not
have the force of law, the Handbook "provides significant guidance
in construing the Protocol, to which Congress sought to conform. 67
The Supreme Court further observed that the Handbook "has been
widely considered useful in giving content to the obligations that the
Protocol establishes."6 8 The words of the Supreme Court indicate
that the explanations of the terms of the Protocol contained in the
Handbook may be used in interpreting the terms and provisions of
the Refugee Act. Pursuant to this directive, the term persecution, as
used in the Refugee Act, includes a threat to life or freedom on
account of one of the enumerated grounds.6
§ 101(a)(42)(A) [the statutory definition of a refugee], even independent of establishing a well-
founded fear of future persecution." Desir v. llchert, 840 F.2d 723, 729 (9th Cir. 1988); see also
infra notes 89-118 and accompanying text (discussing In re Chen and administrative recognition
of the independence of the past persecution standard from the well-founded fear standard).
62. Andrioff, supra note 33, at 135; Weber, supra note 30, at 956.
63. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 48, at 3.8.
64. HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER
THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES (1979)
[hereinafter HANDBOOK 1. At the outset of the Handbook, the High Commissioner stated that the
Handbook "is meant for the guidance of government officials concerned with the determination of
refugee status in the various Contracting States [those states which ratified or acceded to either
the Convention, the Protocol, or both]." Id. at 2.
65. Id. at 14 cl. 51 (emphasis added).
66. 480 U.S. 421 (1986).
67. Id. at 439 n.22.
68. Id.
69. The full description of "persecution" is given in the Handbook. HANDBOOK, supra note 64,
at 14 cls. 51-53. One commentator offered the following description of persecution: "Persecution
results where the measures in question harm those interests and the integrity and inherent dignity
of the human being to a degree considered unacceptable under prevailing international standards
or under higher standards prevailing in the state faced with determining a claim to asylum or
refugee status." GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 48, at 43 (emphasis added); see also supra note 58
and accompanying text (listing the grounds on which an alien may be found to be a refugee).
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4. Discretionary Nature of Asylum
Even when an alien qualifies as a refugee under the Refugee Act
upon either the past persecution or the well-founded fear of persecu-
tion ground,70 the refugee cannot obtain asylum unless the Attorney
General favorably exercises his discretion and grants the refugee
asylum.7 1 The discretionary nature of asylum stems from the gener-
ally recognized rule of international law that every sovereign nation
has exclusive control over persons present in its territory.7 2 One of
the implications of this rule is that every sovereign nation has the
right to grant or deny asylum to those located within its bounda-
ries.73 It is therefore recognized that the right of asylum is the right
of a nation, rather than the right of an asylum-seeker. 4
The Convention and the Protocol embody the concept of discre-
tionary asylum. 75 Similarly, the Refugee Act, which intentionally
mirrors many of the provisions of the Protocol, embodies the pro-
position that the right of asylum belongs to the nation, and hence
70. This Comment considers only the topic of past persecution. The topic of the well-founded
fear of persecution standard is beyond the scope of this Comment and is not examined here.
Asylum eligibility based on a well-founded fear of persecution is treated extensively in numerous
articles, books, and court opinions. See, e.g., I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1986)
(differentiating between past persecution and well-founded fear of persecution and discussing the
well-founded fear standard); In re Mogharrabi, Interim Dec. No. 3028, at 9 (BIA June 12, 1987)
(stating that "an applicant for asylum has established a well founded fear if he shows that a
reasonable person in his circumstances would fear persecution"); HING, supra note 12, § 6.4 (dis-
cussing the well-founded fear standard); Barbara Jackman, Well-Founded Fear of Persecution
and Other Standards of Decision-Making: A North American Perspective, in ASYLUM LAW &
PRACTICE IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA (Geoffry Coil & Jacqueline Bhabha eds., 1992) (dis-
cussing asylum eligibility and the well-founded fear standard).
71. See In re Pula, Interim Dec. No. 3033 (BIA Sept. 22, 1987) (listing the factors to be
considered in deciding whether a discretionary grant of asylum should be made).
72. Felice Morgenstern, The Right of Asylum, 1949 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L. L. 327.
73. See Paul Weis, Legal Aspects of the Convention of 25 July 1951 Relating to the Status of
Refugees, 1953 BRIT. YB. INT'L. L. 478, 481 (discussing the question of the right of asylum); see
also GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 48, at 121 (discussing the granting of asylum as a right to be
exercised by the government); 2 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 757
(1906) (stating that the right to asylum is the right of a government to grant or withhold resi-
dence privileges); Gregg A. Beyer, Affirmative Asylum Adjudication in the United States, 6 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 253, 257 (1992) (noting that accepting refugees is a discretionary exercise of na-
tional sovereignty); Morgenstern, supra note 72, at 331 (discussing the right to asylum in relation
to the state of origin).
74. See Morgenstern, supra note 72, at 327, 335 (arguing that each nation's right to grant
asylum to those present within its boundaries derives from each nation's territorial sovereignty and
positing that "[tlhere can be no doubt that the individual has no general 'right' of asylum against
the state").
75. See Deborah E. Anker, Exercising Discretion in Asylum Cases, IMMIGR. J., April-June
1983, at 11, 18 (stating that "in the specific context of the U.N. Protocol, it is not the individual
who has a right to asylum, but rather the right is vested in the acceding states").
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that the grant of asylum "is left within the discretion of the Attor-
ney General.""6 While an alien has no right to asylum itself, he does
have a right to petition for asylum in the United States."
Unless an alien qualifies as a refugee under the Refugee Act, the
Attorney General may not exercise his discretion and grant the alien
asylum. Furthermore, even if an alien qualifies as a refugee, it is of
no avail to him in his efforts to secure asylum unless the Attorney
General also exercises discretion.78 The Refugee Act thus presents
the asylum-seeker with a double hurdle: he must first qualify as a
refugee under the Refugee Act and then obtain the Attorney Gen-
eral's discretionary grant of asylum. Unless an asylum-seeker over-
comes both of these hurdles, he cannot receive asylum in the United
States. The next section considers how changed conditions in an
alien's country of origin affect his asylum eligibility.
II. THE EFFECT OF CHANGE IN AN ALIEN'S COUNTRY OF ORIGIN
ON His ASYLUM ELIGIBILITY
Most aliens seeking asylum wait several years from the time of
their original application before receiving a final determination of
their asylum eligibility.7 9 During this time, changes of regime or
other changes in conditions in the alien's country of origin may oc-
cur. When change does indeed occur, the question arises whether,
following the change, an alien remains eligible for refugee status
and thus for asylum. The following two sections explore and com-
pare the United Nations's and the United States's positions on the
issue of asylum eligibility in light of changed conditions.
A. The United Nations's Position
The Convention expressly does not apply to any person who, due
to changed conditions, can no longer refuse to seek protection from
persecution from his own government.80 Because the Protocol
76. Id. at 18.
77. Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982) (discussing the right of
aliens to submit and substantiate their claims for asylum).
78. The exercise of discretion is reviewable under an abuse of discretion standard. Under this
standard of review, broad discretion is generally afforded to the decision-maker. KURZBAN, supra
note 41, at 228 (citing Rojas v. I.N.S., 937 F.2d 186, 189-90 (5th Cir. 1991)). However, the
failure to exercise discretion constitutes an abuse of discretion. Id. at 553 (citing Accardi v.
Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 268 (1954)).
79. See Beyer, supra note 73, at 278.
80. Convention, supra note 46, at 6262. Article I(C) provides:
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adopted the substantive provisions of the Convention, the foregoing
limitation on refugee status, flowing out of changes in the alien's
country of origin, is binding on all the nations which ratified or ac-
ceded to the Protocol. 81 However, the Convention, and the Protocol
by adoption, except from the scope of the limiting provision any per-
son "who is able to invoke compelling reasons arising out of previous
persecution . .".8."2 The High Commissioner concluded that this
exemption applied to a situation in which, despite "fundamental
changes" in an alien's country of origin, an alien will not lose his
refugee status because he "may have been subjected to very serious
persecution in the past . -" The High Commissioner noted that
the exemption reflects a general humanitarian principle that those
who suffered serious persecution in the past should not be expected
to repatriate. 84 The High Commissioner explained the reasoning be-
hind the exemption by stating that "[e]ven though there may have
been a change of regime in his country, this may not always produce
a complete change in the attitude of the population, nor, in view of
his past experiences, in the mind of the refugee."'85
The United Nations's position on the effect of change in an alien's
country of origin on his asylum eligibility can thus be summarized
as follows: whether an alien should be ineligible for refugee status
because of a change of conditions in his country of origin depends
upon the severity of the persecution he suffered.
B. The Position Expressed by the Refugee Act and by Federal
Regulations
Similar to the Convention, the Refugee Act allows for the termi-
nation of an alien's status as a refugee if the Attorney General de-
This Convention shall cease to apply to any person falling under the terms of section
A [the refugee definition] if . . .(5) He can no longer, because the circumstances in
connexion [sic] with which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist,
continue to refuse to avail himself of the protection of the country of his nationality
Id.
81. Protocol, supra note 2, at 6225; see also HANDBOOK, supra note 62, at 4 cl. 9 (stating that
"[bly accession to the 1967 Protocol, States undertake to apply the substantive provisions of the
1951 Convention to refugees as defined in the Convention, but without the 1951 dateline").
82. Convention, supra note 46, at 6263.
83. HANDBOOK, supra note 64, at 31 cl. 136.
84. Id. At least one commentator agrees that "[tihe object of the exception to the effects of a
change of circumstances is clearly the continuation of protection for those who have suffered most
seriously in their country of origin." GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 48, at 52.
85. HANDBOOK, supra note 64, at 31 cl. 136.
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termines that the alien no longer qualifies as a refugee under the
Refugee Act due to a change of conditions in his country of origin.8 6
Under the regulations, the alien's asylum can be revoked if the INS
establishes that "[t]he alien no longer has a well-founded fear of
persecution upon return [to his country of origin] due to a change of
conditions in the alien's country of nationality or habitual residence
"87
If an alien has not yet secured asylum, and conditions in his coun-
try of origin have changed to such an extent that he can no longer
demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution were he to return,
the first of the two grounds of asylum eligibility established by the
Refugee Act - the well-founded fear of persecution - would be
unavailable to him. As a result, the alien's asylum eligibility would
rest on a claim based solely on the second eligibility ground, that of
past persecution. The federal regulations promulgated under the
Refugee Act provide that an alien's application for asylum "shall be
denied if the applicant establishes past persecution . . . but is deter-
mined not also to have a well-founded fear of future persecution
...unless . . . the applicant has demonstrated compelling reasons
for being unwilling to return to his country of [origin] ...arising
out of the severity of the past persecution."88
The United States's position on asylum eligibility in light of
changed conditions in the alien's country of origin, as expressed by
the Refugee Act and by the regulations, is identical to the United
Nations's position as expressed by the High Commissioner. Both the
Refugee Act, with its accompanying regulations, and the Conven-
tion contemplate an alien's continued asylum eligibility despite a
change of conditions in his country of origin. Both positions base
this continued eligibility for asylum on the existence of compelling
reasons arising from the severity of the past persecution suffered by
the alien. This is the same approach the BIA used in In re Chen.89
86. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b) (1992). The statute specifically provides that discretionary asylum
"may be terminated if the Attorney General, pursuant to such regulations as the Attorney Gen-
eral may prescribe, determines that the alien is no longer a refugee within the meaning of section
1101 (a)(42)(A) of this title owing to a change in circumstances in the alien's country of national-
ity ...." Id.
87. 8 C.F.R. § 208.24(a)(1) (1990).
88. Id. § 208.13(b)(1)(ii) (emphasis added).
89. Interim Dec. No. 3104 (BIA Apr. 25, 1989); see also supra notes 23-30 and accompanying
text (noting the structure and role of the BIA).
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C. The Board of Immigration Appeals' Position in In re Chen
The BIA, in In re Chen,"° recognized and applied the principle of
continued asylum eligibility in light of changed conditions in an
alien's country of origin.9 Chen is the only BIA decision which, in a
climate of changed conditions in the alien's country of origin, re-
sulted in a grant of asylum based solely on the allegation of severe
past persecution.
Chen was a Chinese citizen who was admitted into the United
States as a non-immigrant student. 92 He remained in the United
States beyond the expiration date of his visa.93 Subsequently, the
INS brought a deportation action against Chen, and an Immigra-
tion Judge issued an order to show cause why he should not be de-
ported. 94 At the deportation hearing, Chen applied for asylum and
the withholding of deportation.95
Chen's application for asylum and his testimony at the deporta-
tion hearing indicated that his father, a Christian minister in China,
had been a target of the Red Guards during the Cultural Revolu-
tion.9" Chen's father was forbidden to continue his ministry, his in-
come was terminated, his house was ransacked by the Red Guards,
and he was imprisoned.97 Later, Chen's father was "dragged
through the streets in a humiliating fashion over 50 times and was
daily required to write confessions of his [so-called] crimes." 98 On
one occasion, described as a "Bible burning crusade," Chen's father
was badly burned after being pushed into a "bonfire of Bibles."99
The Red Guards continued their harsh treatment of Chen's father
until his death at the age of forty-six. 100
Chen's application for asylum and his related testimony revealed
90. Interim Dec. No. 3104 (BIA Apr. 25, 1989).
91. Id. at 7. Note that Chen is an administrative decision of the BIA. While BIA decisions are
not precedential for federal courts, the United States Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. said, "We have long recognized that considerable weight
should be accorded to an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted
to administer. ... Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 844 (1984).




96. Id. at 9.
97. Id.
98. Id.




that after his father's home was ransacked, Chen was locked in a
room with his grandmother for over six months. 101 During the six
months of his house arrest, Chen was not allowed to continue his
education. 10 He was also interrogated, deprived of food, kicked, and
bitten by the Red Guards.' 3 When he returned to school, he was
"abused and humiliated," and on one occasion, when he fell asleep
at school, "[r]ocks were thrown at him,"104 causing him injuries re-
quiring "a month of intensive treatment."' 1 5 In the following years,
he was sent to rural villages for "reeducation."'' 06 Chen further al-
leged that he was treated harshly, was denied medical attention on
two occasions, and was locked in a closet for five hours when he
failed to write an "extensive criticism of his father demanded by one
of his teachers."' 01 Chen stated that he lived in "'complete social
isolation,' and that as the son of a Christian minister, he could
'never outlive [his] status as a pariah, an outcast, an 'unrepentent'
[sic] element.' "108 Finally, Chen testified that he would rather com-
mit suicide than return to China.'09
The Immigration Judge concluded that because of the changed
conditions in China, specifically the " 'leniency of the present Gov-
ernment of China to mere religious activity,' " Chen could not have
a well-founded fear of persecution in the future." 0 Upon reaching
this conclusion, the Immigration Judge denied Chen's application
for asylum and found him deportable."'
Chen appealed and the BIA granted his application for asylum." 2
The INS then moved the BIA to reconsider and clarify its deci-
sion." 8 The BIA granted this motion, reconsidered its decision, and








107. Id. at 11.
108. Id. (alterations in original).
109. Id.
110. Id. The Immigration Judge's decision was bolstered by a BHRHA advisory opinion which
stated that Chen did not have a well-founded fear of persecution. Id. at 16-17 (Heilman, Board
Member, concurring).
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In deciding to grant Chen asylum, the BIA recognized that the
Refugee Act provides two independent grounds for establishing asy-
lum eligibility: past persecution and a well-founded fear of persecu-
tion.115 The BIA stated that "there may be cases where the
favorable exercise of discretion is warranted for humanitarian rea-
sons even if there is little likelihood of future persecution." '1 16 In
support of this statement, the BIA cited the general humanitarian
principle set forth in the Handbook, which states that those who
have suffered serious persecution in the past should not be expected
to repatriate despite changed conditions in their country of origin."'
In reaching its decision to grant Chen asylum in the absence of a
well-founded fear of persecution, the BIA took into account the fact
that he suffered serious persecution on the basis of religion, one of
the asylum eligibility grounds specifically codified in the Refugee
Act, and the fact that he feared repatriation. 1 8 In Chen, the BIA
thus applied the position of the United Nations and the Refugee Act
that an alien who has based his refugee status on past persecution
does not lose that status due to changed conditions in his country of
origin if he can show that he was subjected to serious past persecu-
tion, one of the recognized grounds for refugee status.
D. Current Administrative and Judicial Positions on the Past
Persecution Standard
1. Board of Immigration Appeals
Chen, however well-reasoned and grounded in the Refugee Act
and the Convention, is unique among BIA and court decisions in its
emphasis on past persecution as a determinative factor in evaluating
asylum eligibility.' In In re D- L- & A- M-," 2 I the BIA
utilized the more common approach to evaluating whether to grant
asylum and focused on a well-founded fear of persecution. The D-
L- & A- M- decision is significant in the context of this
115. Id. at 4-5. The BIA noted that "[t]here has, heretofore, been less emphasis in the courts
and within this Board on situations where past persecution is the main, or only, basis for an
asylum applicant's claim. However, it is clear from the plain language of the statute that past
persecution can be the basis for a persecution claim. ... Id. at 5.
116. Id. at 7.
117. Id. at 8 (citing HANDBOOK, supra note 64, at 31 cl. 136).
118. Id. at 12-13.
119. See supra note 115 (noting that in the past, courts placed little emphasis on situations
where persecution was the main basis for asylum application).
120. Interim Dec. No. 3162 (BIA Oct. 16, 1991).
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Comment because it shows an unwillingness to grant asylum on the
basis of past persecution, even in a situation where the conditions in
the alien's country of origin did not change.
In D- L- & A'-- M-, the BIA affirmed the Immigration
Judge's decision to deny asylum to a husband and wife, both of
whom were Cuban citizens.' 21 In 1989, the couple used falsified
Spanish passports to board a U.S.-bound commercial flight in
Spain. 2' Immediately upon their arrival in the United States, they
surrendered their passports to INS officials, identified themselves as
Cuban citizens, and requested asylum.2 3 The husband's history of
confrontations with the Castro government prior to his departure
from Cuba in 1983 substantiated his claim to asylum.'24 Specifi-
cally, the alien alleged that he was a member of an organization
which intended to overthrow the Castro government.'2 5
In 1963, the Cuban police arrested the husband for his activities
in the anti-Castro organization.12' Following his arrest, he was de-
tained for three months without a trial, and while in jail was tor-
tured and raped. 2 7 Upon his release from jail, he was forbidden
from resuming work at his former job. 28 The alien further alleged
that his father was also arrested in 1963 and was sentenced to
prison for five years for participating in the anti-Castro organiza-
tion. 12 9 Like the alien, his father was abused in prison; he died seven
months after his release.' 30 The alien was arrested and questioned
by the Cuban police on other occasions, most recently in 1980.1
31
During the last detention he was held for twenty-four hours and
threatened to be tried for the same crimes as his father.
32
The Immigration Judge denied the aliens.' applications for asylum
on statutory grounds and held that they did not merit asylum as a
matter of discretion. 33 The aliens appealed on the grounds that the
121. Id. at 1.
122. Id. at 2.
123. Id.
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Immigration Judge did not properly consider the male applicant's
testimony of past persecution. 3 In affirming the Immigration
Judge's decision, the BIA relied primarily on the well-founded fear
standard. 3 With respect to past persecution, the BIA only consid-
ered the alien's most recent arrest and concluded that it did not
constitute persecution. 36 The BIA then stated that "asylum may be
denied as a matter of discretion if there is little likelihood of present
persecution. 1 37 The BIA decided that the 1963 arrest and the re-
striction on employment did not establish the alien's "well-founded
fear of detention or harm upon returning to Cuba on account of his
political opinion or other statutory grounds."13 8 Because the BIA
found "little likelihood" of future persecution, it decided not to
reach the issue of whether the alien's 1963 arrest and mistreatment
in jail constituted past persecution. 39 Consequently, the BIA exer-
cised its discretion and denied asylum to the aliens. 141
2. Courts of Appeals Decisions for Circuits Other Than Seventh
Subsequent to the BIA's decision in Chen,"" various circuits have
acknowledged that an alien may qualify for asylum on the basis of
past persecution, provided that repatriation would be inhumane." 2
In none of the cases under review where changed conditions were
involved, however, have the courts found the alleged past persecu-
tion sufficiently severe to warrant asylum.
Judge D.H. Ginsburg of the District of Columbia Circuit con-
fronted an asylum case involving changed conditions in an alien's
134. Id. at 3.
135. Id. at 5.
136. Id. (citing Zalega v. I.N.S., 916 F.2d 1257, 1260-61 (7th Cir. 1990)); see also infra notes
174-93 (discussing the Zalega decision, which supports the proposition that an alien "has not
shown that the circumstances of that brief detention and interrogation constituted persecution").
137. D- L- & A- M-,- Interim Dec. No. 3162, at 5 (BIA Oct. 16, 1991) (citing In re
Chen, Interim Dec. No. 3104 (BIA Apr. 25, 1989)); see also supra notes 90-118 and accompany-
ing text (supporting this proposition).
138. D-- L-- & A--- M--, Interim Dec. No. 3162, at 5 (BIA Oct 16, 1991).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Interim Dec. No. 3104 (BIA Apr. 25, 1989); see also supra notes 90-118 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the Chen case).
142. See, e.g., Tokarska v. I.N.S., 978 F.2d 1, 2 (Ist Cir. 1992) (acknowledging that where
repatriation would be inhumane, asylum may be granted solely on the basis of past persecution);
Skalak v. I.N.S., 944 F.2d 364, 365 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating that a history of severe persecution
may make repatriation inhumane).
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country in Gutierrez-Rogue v. I.N.S. 43 This case involved a Nicara-
guan woman who alleged that, among other things, she was
"threatened with jail," visited weekly by Sandinista security officers,
and threatened with death by a civilian group supporting the
Sandinista Defense Committee. 144 The Sandinista government pur-
sued Gutierrez-Rogue because her husband was an Air Force ser-
geant before the revolution who subsequently fled Nicaragua and
joined the "Contras.' 45 The government also pursued her because
she refused to join the neighborhood Sandinista Defense Committee
and failed to otherwise support the Sandinista regime.14 6
The BIA denied Gutierrez-Rogue's application for asylum, rea-
soning that she could not have a well-founded fear of persecution in
light of the fall of the Sandinista regime.1 47 The BIA acknowledged
that the Sandinistas persecuted Gutierrez-Rogue, but denied her
asylum as a matter of discretion.1 48 Gutierrez-Rogue then appealed
this decision.
Judge Ginsburg reviewed the BIA decision under an abuse of dis-
cretion standard. The judge compared her claim to that of the plain-
tiff in In re Chen""9 and said that what Gutierrez-Rogue suffered,
"although no doubt very frightening, was not nearly [as] severe [as
what Chen had suffered]." 15 Judge Ginsburg then concluded that
the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying asylum in this
case.
1 51
In Tokarska v. I.N.S.,15 2 the First Circuit acknowledged that
where repatriation would be inhumane, asylum may be granted
based solely on past persecution, but it failed to find such a situation
in the case under review. In this case, Tokarska, a Polish Solidarity
143. 954 F.2d 769 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
144. Id. at 771. Sandinistas also coerced Gutierrez-Rogue to spend one year in Cuba studying
Marxism and teaching in exchange for her husband's release from imprisonment. Id. When she
refused to spend two more years in Cuba, the Sandinista government assigned her to teach at a
school far from her home. Id. The government also took away her food rationing card. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 770.
148. Id. at 771.
149. See supra notes 90-118 and accompanying text (discussing the Chen decision).
150. Gutierrez-Rogue, 954 F.2d at 772.
151. Id. Similarly, the Fourth Circuit recently held that it was not an abuse of discretion for
the BIA to deny asylum based on past persecution consisting of verbal and written threats to an
alien and his family. Chavez-Robles v. I.N.S., No. 91-2511, 1992 U.S. App, LEXIS 13618, at *8
(4th Cir. June 10, 1992).
152. 978 F.2d I (lst Cir. 1992).
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member, was struck and injured by a tear-gas canister during an
anti-government demonstration, was arrested during another dem-
onstration, and suffered physical injury at the hands of the police.15
In deciding to deny Tokarska asylum, the First Circuit cited a
decision of the Seventh Circuit in which Judge Richard Posner
stated, "'The experience of persecution may so sear a person with
distressing associations with his native country that it would be in-
humane to force him to return there, even though he is in no danger
of further persecution.' "154 The First Circuit decided Tokarska's
was "not such a case."' 155
The Fifth Circuit, in Rivera-Cruz v. I.N.S. 56 found no error in a
BIA decision concluding that in light of the changed conditions in
Nicaragua" 7 and despite past persecution, an alien did not merit
asylum. 58 Rivera-Cruz's claim of past persecution was based on an
incident during which he was beaten by Sandinista soldiers to a
point where he suffered a broken leg and a broken finger, requiring
twenty-five days of hospitalization. 59 The court stated that the facts
"d[id] not indicate a level of persecution such that repatriation
would be inhumane."' 60
In Klawitter v. I.N.S., 61 the Sixth Circuit considered the alleged
persecution of a Polish alien, which consisted of interrogations,
threats by Polish secret police, and a rape by a colonel of the secret
police.' 62 The court decided that even if these allegations were true,
they did not rise to the level of abuse suffered by the asylum-seeker
in the Chen case.'63 The court reasoned that because gross persecu-
tion like that alleged in Chen was not alleged in this case, the "hu-
manitarian considerations" present in Chen were lacking here."
153. Id. at 2. Tokarska was also jailed for twenty-four hours, her desk at work was searched,
and she was discriminated against at her job. Id.
154. Id. (citing Skalak v. I.N.S., 944 F.2d 364, 365 (7th Cir. 1991)); see also infra notes 226-
27 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Posner's view of asylum claims based on past
persecution).
155. Tokarska, 978 F.2d at 2.
156. 948 F.2d 962 (5th Cir. 1991).
157. In April 1990, the Sandinista regime was replaced by a popularly elected government led
by Violeta Chamorro. Id. at 965.
158. Id. at 969.
159. Id. at 965.
160. Id. at 969.
161. 970 F.2d 149 (6th Cir. 1992).
162. Id. at 150.
163. Id. at 153; see also supra notes 90-118 (discussing the decision in Chen).
164. Klawitter, 970 F.2d at 153.
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Thus, while courts acknowledge Chen, they do not view alleged per-
secution in pther cases involving changed conditions as severe
enough to warrant asylum. In this respect, the Seventh Circuit is no
different.
3. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
Recent decisions of the Seventh Circuit reflect the BIA's stance in
D- L- & A- M--' rather than its position in In re Chen. 66
Whether or not the particular conditions in an alien's country of
origin have changed, the Seventh Circuit concentrates on the well-
founded fear standard and summarily dismisses allegations of perse-
cution that do not satisfy the past persecution standard.
In Kubon v. I.N.S.,167 the Seventh Circuit affirmed a BIA deci-
sion denying a Polish asylum-seeker's request for asylum and the
withholding of deportation.' Kubon asserted that he was a member
of Solidarity, an anti-government organization."6 9 As a part of his
membership in Solidarity, Kubon attended meetings, distributed
leaflets and anti-government literature, and participated in demon-
strations.17 He based his claim to asylum on both past persecution
and a well-founded fear of persecution, substantiated by a five-day
detention for transporting anti-government literature.1
7
'
Because the BIA took administrative notice that Solidarity had
become a part of the coalition governing Poland, the Seventh Cir-
cuit affirmed the BIA's holding that Kubon's fear of persecution by
the Polish government for his membership in Solidarity was not
well-founded. 72 With respect to Kubon's claim of. past persecution,
the Seventh Circuit held that the five-day detention for political op-
position did not amount to past persecution.7 3
A month later, the Seventh Circuit decided Zalega v. I.N.S. 74 In
165. Interim Dec. No. 3162 (BIA Oct. 16, 1991).
166. Interim Dec. No. 3104 (B1A Apr. 25, 1989).
167. 913 F.2d 386 (7th Cir. 1990).
168: Id. at 388.
169. Id. at 387.
170. Id. at 388.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. The court reasoned that the evidence of a five-day detention for transporting anti-
government literature did not establish Kubon's claim of past persecution "since a brief confine-
ment for political opposition to a totalitarian regime does not necessarily constitute persecution."
Id. (citation omitted).
174. 916 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1990). Although the Seventh Circuit decided Zalega after
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this case, the court raised the level of evidence needed to warrant
asylum eligibility on the grounds of past persecution. 75 Like Kubon,
Zalega was a citizen of Poland. 176 Zalega, however, was not a mem-
ber of the Solidarity organization.'" His problems with the Com-
munist government of Poland started at the end of 1981, when he
refused to sign an oath of loyalty to Communist party officials. 17 8
Following his refusal to sign the oath, military police arrested and
interrogated Zalega on three occasions. 179 Within a few months of
his refusal to sign the oath, Zalega was dismissed from his job as a
manager of a Polish government-owned farm.' 80 Beginning that
same year, and continuing until he left Poland two years later, the
police regularly arrested Zalega, each time interrogating him for
three to five hours about his association with a certain Solidarity
member and about other aspects of his life.18 ' Following his last ar-
rest, Zalega was detained for thirty-six hours.' 82 When Zalega re-
turned home, he found that in his absence his apartment had been
searched and that some of his personal property had been
confiscated.' 83
Zalega entered the United States in 1984 as a visitor.' 84 When he
overstayed his visa, the INS obtained an Order to Show Cause why
he should not be deported. 85 At that point, Zalega applied for asy-
lum and the withholding of deportation on the basis of political per-
secution.' 86 In addition to the foregoing facts, Zalega also alleged
that the police had detained his parents and searched their home
after his brother left Poland for the United States, and that after his
own departure from Poland the police had questioned his parents.8 7
Kubon, and subsequent to changes in the political regime in Poland which made future persecu-
tion based on Solidarity membership or anti-communist activities less likely, the Seventh Circuit
in Zalega reviewed the BIA's decision as if no changes took place because the changes in Poland
transpired after the BIA rendered its decision in the case. Id. at 1261 n.5.
175. Id. at 1260-61.
176. Id. at 1258.
177. Id. at 1258 n.2.
178. Id. at 1258.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1258-59.








Finally, Zalega testified that if he returned to Poland, "the authori-
ties would resume the questioning, would deny him suitable govern-
ment employment and would not allow him to travel to capitalist
countries.' 88 The Immigration Judge denied Zalega's applications
and the BIA affirmed, concluding that the harassment Zalega suf-
fered did not amount to persecution. 189
The Seventh Circuit reviewed the BIA's conclusion that Zalega's
mistreatment at the hands of the Polish authorities was insufficient
to show past persecution and affirmed the BIA's decision to deny
asylum.' The Seventh Circuit found that the BIA's conclusion that
Zalega did not suffer past persecution was supported by substantial
evidence because "Zalega was never formally charged or convicted
of any crime, was detained for relatively short periods of time and
was not mistreated while incarcerated."' 9' In support of its decision,
the Seventh Circuit further noted that Zalega was able to leave Po-
land and visit the United States.'92 Addressing Zalega's fear of re-
turning to Poland, the court reasoned that because it found that the
harassment Zalega suffered did not constitute persecution, his fear
that he would experience the same harassment upon return, however
genuine it might have been, did not satisfy the well-founded fear of
persecution standard.' 93
After Kubon and Zalega, the Seventh Circuit continued to focus
on the well-founded fear of persecution standard and remained un-
moved by allegations of past persecution. In the unpublished, con-
solidated case of Szczech v. I.N.S., 94 the court had an opportunity
to examine a range of conduct to determine whether any of it
amounted to persecution, and, if it did, whether it was persecution
grave enough to justify a grant of asylum even in the absence of a
well-founded fear of future persecution.
The three aliens involved in these consolidated cases - Szczech,
Wilamowski, and Chrzascik - were Polish citizens who, prior to
leaving Poland, were active in the outlawed Solidarity organiza-
tion. "'95 The first of these cases involved Szczech, who was a promi-
188. Id. at 1260-61.
189. Id. at 1261.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1260.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1261.
194. Nos. 90-2307, 91-2584, 91-2642, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14077 (7th Cir. May 26, 1992).
195. Id. at *1, 3-4.
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nent local organizer of Solidarity. 96 Szczech had entered the
United States illegally to escape the abuse he suffered under the
Communist authorities for his membership in Solidarity.19 7 While in
Poland, Szczech was arrested eight to nine times, and each time he
was detained for twenty-four to forty-eight hours. 9 ' During several
of the detentions, he was questioned and beaten.199 Szczech's house
was often searched, and the authorities "approached his family in
an intimidating manner."200 Furthermore, the authorities arrested
and questioned his brother about Szczech's Solidarity activities.2 1
Szczech applied for asylum when the INS commenced deporta-
tion proceedings against him.20 2 The Immigration Judge decided
that Szczech's Solidarity activities did "not reach the level which
would result in the Polish government pinpointing him for persecu-
tion '20 3 and denied his request for asylum. On appeal from the Im-
migration Judge's decision, the BIA took administrative notice of
the changed conditions in Poland, notably that the leader of Solidar-
ity, Lech Walesa, had been elected President of Poland. 204 Because
the former leader of Solidarity had become the President of Poland,
the BIA concluded that Szczech did not possess a well-founded fear
of persecution.20 5 The BIA also held that the abuse Szczech suffered
in Poland did not constitute such past persecution as would allow a
grant of asylum in the absence of a well-founded fear of
persecution .206
Like Szczech, Wilamowski had fled Poland after being abused by
Polish authorities for his association with Solidarity, 20 7 and he en-
tered the United States as a visitor.20 8 Before he left Poland, Wi-
lamowski had met with Lech Walesa on two occasions, sabotaged a
Soviet building, and distributed leaflets.20 9 Wilamowski was arrested
on seven occasions and kept in detention for forty-eight hours each
















time. 10 He was interrogated and beaten while in detention,"' and
he was also threatened with imprisonment for a life term and with
labor at a Siberian work-camp. 212
As in Szczech's case, the Immigration Judge determined that the
abuse Wilamowski suffered did not rise to the level of persecu-
tion.2 13 Furthermore, the Immigration Judge decided that Wi-
lamowski could not have possessed a well-founded fear of persecu-
tion since Solidarity controlled many areas of the government. 4
The BIA affirmed the Immigration Judge's decision to deny asylum
and held that the treatment Wilamowski suffered at the hands of
the Communist Polish authorities "was not severe enough to block
repatriation ... ,25
Much like Szczech and Wilamowski, Chrzascik too left Poland to
escape harsh treatment by the Communist authorities due to his in-
volvement in the Solidarity organization. 1 While in Poland, he had
printed and distributed leaflets in support of Solidarity and stored
Solidarity's flags and banners.21 7 Polish militia and secret police had
raided Chrzascik's home and arrested him .21 During detention, he
was interrogated and "beaten about the head and body with a lead
pipe. ' Before leaving Poland, he was arrested several more times
and was detained, threatened, and beaten. 20 After he left Poland,
his wife, who had remained in the country, was "questioned,
harassed, and threatened. ' 2 1 The BIA held that Chrzascik did not
have a well-founded fear of persecution and that the abuse he "re-
ceived from Polish authorities was not so severe as to warrant
asylum. '
z22
Upon reviewing the BIA decisions in the Szczech, Wilamowski,
and Chrzascik cases, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the BIA that




213. Id. at *4.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at *4-5.
217. Id. at *4.




222. Id. at *6.
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vidual asylum-seeker's fear of persecution was not well-founded.22 3
The Seventh Circuit reached this conclusion despite the three aliens'
allegations that, regardless of the Solidarity party's position in the
government, the police and military continued to be controlled by
the same authorities who had inflicted the abuse and harassment
before Solidarity's rise to power.224
The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that each of the aliens suf-
fered physical harm as a result of their political opinions. 25 The
court, however, recalled the opinion written by Judge Posner in
Skalak v. I.N.S.,226 in which the judge hypothesized that even past
persecution as severe as that endured by survivors of Nazi concen-
tration camps might not be sufficient to prevent a forced repatria-
tion of those survivors to Germany if the persecuted group was gov-
erning there.227 In the present cases, the Seventh Circuit held that
"whatever the minimum level of past persecution may be to avoid
repatriation, 22 8 the past persecution suffered by the aliens in these
cases did not reach that level. Consequently, the court affirmed the
BIA's denials of asylum to Szczech, Wilamowski, and Chrzascik. 229
The foregoing cases illustrate that whether or not a change of
regime or conditions in a particular alien's country of origin has
taken place, the Seventh Circuit follows the D- L- & A- M-
-230 prospective focus on the well-founded fear standard rather
than the Chen23 retrospective consideration of allegations of perse-
cution. The court examines whether an alien has a well-founded fear
of persecution, and where it finds this is not the case, lists the al-
223. Id. at *7.
224. Id.
225. Id. at *8.
226. 944 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1991).
227. Szczech, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14077, at *7 (citing Skalak v. I.N.S., 944 F.2d 364, 365
(7th Cir. 1991)). In Skalak, Judge Posner specifically said:
The experience of persecution may so sear a person with distressing associations with
his native country that it would be inhumane to force him to return there, even
though he is in no danger of further persecution. Very few of the surviving German
Jews returned to Germany after the destruction of the Nazi regime, and it would
have been cruel to force them to do so on the ground that bygones are bygones. In
such cases the attempted rebuttal fails; in lesser cases of past persecution and perhaps
even in the most serious cases if the persecuted group has become the ruling group,
deportation may not be inhumane.
Skalak, 944 F.2d at 365.
228. Szczech, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14077, at *8.
229. Id.
230. Interim Dec. No. 3162 (BIA Oct. 16, 1991).
231. Interim Dec. No. 3104 (BIA Apr. 25, 1989).
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leged incidents of past persecution and dismisses them as insufficient
for a grant of asylum. With respect to past persecution, the court
has, in the discussed cases, reviewed a wide range of alleged harsh
treatment of aliens by foreign governmental authorities. In each
case, the court either concluded that the alleged governmental con-
duct did not rise to the level of persecution at all, 32 or that where
there was persecution, in light of the changed conditions the perse-
cution was not sufficient to warrant asylum a.2 3  The allegations of
persecution which the Seventh Circuit has deemed insufficient for
asylum eligibility in light of a changed political climate include ar-
rests,234 detentions,235 threats of life imprisonment or forced labor in
Siberia,236 searches of homes, 37 and numerous beatings,238 includ-
ing blows to the head and body with a lead pipe. 2 9 The Analysis
demonstrates that at least some of these incidents of persecution
constitute compelling reasons for a grant of asylum despite changed
political conditions.
III. ANALYSIS
Under both the Protocol, to which the United States has ac-
ceded,24 and the Refugee Act, past persecution and a well-founded
232. See generally Zalega v. I.N.S., 916 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1990); Kubon v. I.N.S., 913 F.2d
386 (7th Cir. 1990) (both holding that the aliens' alleged mistreatment, including detentions,
interrogations, searches of their homes, and dismissals from government-controlled jobs, did not
amount to persecution).
233. See Szczech, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14077, at *8 (holding that in light of a change in
government control, asylum should not be granted).
234. See, e.g., Zalega, 916 F.2d at 1258 (discussing alien's arrest for refusing to sign oath of
loyalty to party officials); Szczech, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14077, at *1, 3-4 (discussing the
arrests of three aliens for their involvement in the Solidarity movement in Poland).
235. See. e.g., Kubon, 913 F.2d at 388 (discussing alien's five-day detention for transporting
anti-government leaflets in Poland); Zalega, 916 F.2d at 1258-59 (describing alien's numerous
detentions and interrogations by police); Szczech, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14077, at *1-5 (discuss-
ing the detention of three different aliens for their involvement with the Solidarity movement in
Poland).
236. See Szczech, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14077, at *3 (discussing Wilamowski's experience
with the Polish government authorities).
237. See, e.g., Zalega, 916 F.2d at 1259 (describing the search of alien's apartment by Polish
authorities and confiscation of his personal property); Szczech, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14077, at
*4-5 (discussing the raid of Chrzascik's home and his subsequent arrest).
238. See generally Szczech, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14077, at *1-5 (discussing three aliens'
experiences of physical abuse inflicted by Polish government authorities).
239. See Id. at *5 (describing Chrzascik's interrogation, arrest, and physical beating by Polish
authorities).
240. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text (discussing President Johnson's approval of
the Protocol in 1968).
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fear of persecution exist as two distinct and independent grounds for
establishing asylum eligibility. 241 Therefore, as has been judicially
recognized,24 2 an asylum-seeking alien will meet the requirement for
refugee status if he has suffered persecution in the past, bases his
application for asylum on that ground, and is able to present evi-
dence supporting his claim of past persecution. An alien who meets
the requirements for refugee status is eligible for the discretionary
grant of asylum "even independent of establishing a well-founded
fear of future persecution. 243
Because the past persecution standard of asylum eligibility does
not require the asylum-seeker to show a well-founded fear of perse-
cution, it is useful to those asylum-seekers who either do not have a
well-founded fear of future persecution or who cannot bear the evi-
dentiary burden associated with that standard. 44 Indeed, the past
persecution standard is the sole means of asylum eligibility for
aliens from countries which have experienced significant changes of
regime or conditions which protect the people in those countries
from persecution.245 This is because where such changes have oc-
curred, it is unlikely that administrative entities or courts involved
in asylum claims would find the requisite well-founded fear of fu-
ture prosecution.
Both the Protocol and the Refugee Act, with its attendant regula-
tions, state that where there has been a change of conditions in an
alien's country of origin such that the conditions "with which he has
been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, 248 the alien is no
241. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (noting the two grounds for asylum eligibility).
242. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing the Cardoza-Fonseca decision in
which the Supreme Court recognized the two grounds for asylum eligibility).
243. Desir v. llchert, 840 F.2d 723, 729 (9th Cir. 1988).
244. To qualify as a refugee under the well-founded fear of persecution standard, an alien must
show a subjective fear of persecution and that a reasonable person in his place would fear persecu-
tion. In re Mogharrabi, 19 i. & N. Dec. 439 (BIA 1987).
245. Recently, for example, significant changes in conditions and regimes swept the countries of
the former Soviet Block. The need for a viable past persecution standard will continue to exist as
more political changes occur. For example, assume that the current conflict in what was formerly
Yugoslavia will one day end. Further assume that Bosnia will be governed by a government repre-
senting Muslims, Croats, and Serbs. Also assume that the new government will be able to protect
the entire population of Bosnia from persecution. A Bosnian Muslim then attempting to seek
asylum in the United States would not be successful, unless the past persecution avenue for refu-
gee status were opened to him. According to current caselaw, because of the change in conditions,
the Bosnian could no longer reasonably fear persecution or refuse to avail himself of the protection
of the Bosnian government.
246. Convention, supra note 46, at 6262.
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longer eligible for asylum. 47 Thus, just as a change in conditions
obliterates the possibility of asylum based on a well-founded fear, it
destroys an asylum claim based on past persecution alone.
The only asylum claim which can survive changed conditions is
one based on past persecution plus something more. The additional
element of a viable asylum claim based on past persecution is a
showing of "compelling reasons ' ' 248 for not repatriating the asylum-
seeker. These compelling reasons arise from the severity of past per-
secution,2 49 and the justification for asylum eligibility based on the
severity of past persecution lies in the humanitarian principle cited
by the High Commissioner in the Handbook.2 50 This principle states
that asylum-seekers who suffered serious persecution in the past
should not be expected to repatriate. 51
Upon a review of the Protocol and the federal regulations promul-
gated under the Refugee Act, it is clear that with respect to asylum
eligibility based upon a change of conditions in an alien's country of
origin, the regulations are identical to the Protocol, as interpreted
by the High Commissioner. While both authorities allow for the ter-
mination of an alien's eligibility for refugee status due to a change
of conditions in the alien's country of origin, they also exempt from
the termination provision those aliens who can show "compelling
reasons"2 52 based upon the severity of past persecution.2 51 It is
therefore both an international obligation of the United States
under the Protocol, and a domestic obligation of the federal govern-
ment under the Refugee Act, to deem as eligible for asylum those
aliens who have suffered severe persecution in the past, even if the
conditions in their countries have changed.
247. See supra notes 80 and 86 and accompanying text (discussing situations in which an alien
is no longer eligible for asylum).
248. See supra note 82 and accompanying text (noting the specific language of the exemption
provided in the Convention); see also supra note 87 and accompanying text (citing the specific
text of the exemption provided in the federal regulations).
249. See supra notes 82 and 87 and accompanying text (noting the specific text of the Conven-
tion and federal regulation).
250. HANDBOOK, supra note 64, at 31 cl. 136.
251. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text (setting forth the humanitarian principle
relating to asylum cases).
252. See supra note 82 and accompanying text (noting the specific language of the exemption
provided in the Convention); see also supra note 87 and accompanying text (noting the specific
text of the exemption provided in the federal regulations).
253. See supra notes 82 and 87 and accompanying text (citing the specific text of the Conven-
tion and applicable federal regulations).
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In Chen,254 the alien could not establish a well-founded fear of
persecution upon return to China because the Immigration Judge
concluded that the Chinese government had become tolerant of reli-
gious activity. 55 The BIA agreed with the Immigration Judge that
a reasonable person in Chen's circumstances would not have a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of religion.2 56 But in that
case, the BIA honored the humanitarian principle and recognized
that although the conditions had changed so that the alien could not
show a well-founded fear of persecution, he nonetheless remained
eligible for asylum because he had suffered severe persecution in the
past.257 The alien's house arrest and physical abuse constituted both
past persecution and compelling reasons sufficient to trigger the hu-
manitarian principle in the minds of the BIA judges.2 58 In Chen, the
BIA thus found the level of persecution sufficiently compelling to
warrant a grant of asylum to an alien who had based his asylum
claim on past persecution.
Unlike the BIA in Chen,25 the Seventh Circuit, as demonstrated
by the decisions in Kubon2 60 and Szczech, 26  has not yet been
presented with a level of past persecution which, in its judgment,
has been sufficiently compelling to warrant a grant of asylum to an
alien who, because of changed conditions in his country of origin,
does not have a well-founded fear of persecution. As Judge Posner's
hypothetical example in Skalak26 2 demonstrates, no alien today
could make the showing the Seventh Circuit demands, for no group
in the recent past has been persecuted to such a degree and in such
numbers as were the Jews at the hands of the Nazis during World
War 11.263 By raising to extreme heights the level of severity of the
254. Interim Dec. No. 3104 (BIA Apr. 25, 1989).
255. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text (citing the Immigration Judge's decision
in Chen).
256. Chen, Interim Dec. No. 3104, at 12.
257. The BIA stated that its "determination that the respondent ha[d] not established a well-
founded fear of present or future persecution [wa]s not in itself determinative, since [it] ha[d]
found that the respondent ha[d] clearly established that he and his family were severely perse-
cuted in the past in China." Id.
258. Id. at 13.
259. Id.
260. 913 F.2d 386 (7th Cir. 1990).
261. Nos. 90-2307, 91-2584, 91-2642, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14077 (7th Cir. May 26, 1992).
262. 944 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1991).
263. While the fate of Muslims in Bosnia today is appalling, it is quantitatively and qualita-
tively different from the treatment of Jews during World War II. Unlike the Jews during World
War II, the Bosnian Muslims have an army and paramilitary groups allegedly inflicting upon
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persecution necessary to demonstrate compelling reasons for a grant
of asylum based on past persecution, the Seventh Circuit has made
the past persecution standard insurmountable.
Unfortunately, other circuits that have considered asylum claims
based on past persecution involving changed conditions have like-
wise set high standards for aliens trying to avoid repatriation be-
cause of treatment they had suffered at home. Many circuits 26 4 ac-
cept the proposition, offered by the BIA in Chen,265 that "there may
be cases where the favorable exercise of discretion is warranted for
humanitarian reasons even if there is little likelihood of future per-
secution." '266 But no circuit has yet acted on this proposition where
changed circumstances were involved. 67 Rather than use the avenue
opened by the Convention and the Protocol, 268 by the Refugee Act
and its regulations, 2 69 and explored by the BIA in Chen,2 70 courts
find the alleged persecution insufficient for a grant of asylum predi-
cated on past persecution. Not since Chen2 17  has a court deemed
alleged past persecution sufficient to warrant a grant of asylum. As
a result, the past persecution standard has lost any real meaning as
a standard of asylum eligibility.
An ineffective past persecution standard not only hurts those
aliens who escape from countries which have experienced changes in
political conditions, but also those aliens, such as the aliens involved
Serbs what the Serbs inflict upon them. Thus, the Bosnian Muslims are not only the persecuted,
but also the persecutors. See HELSINKI WATCH, WAR CRIMES IN BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA (1992).
(containing detailed and substantiated accounts of war crimes committed by all parties to the
conflict in the former Yugoslavia).
264. See supra notes 141-164 and accompanying text (discussing past persecution cases in the
D.C., First, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits).
265. Interim Dec. No. 3104 (BIA Apr. 25, 1989); see also supra notes 90-118 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the Chen decision).
266. Chen, Interim Dec. No. 3104, at 7.
267. Note that in a case preceding Chen that did not involve changed conditions, the Ninth
Circuit in Desir v. llchert considered an asylum claim based on past persecution and held that the
BIA erred when it concluded that the alien in that case did not establish his eligibility for asylum.
840 F.2d 723, 729 (9th Cir. 1988). Desir, a Haitian, sought asylum based on three arrests (one
which lasted approximately two to three weeks), a beating with a wooden stick, and a warning
that if caught again, he would be shot. Id. at 725. The Ninth Circuit concluded that what Desir
suffered at the hands of the Haitian authorities constituted past persecution within the meaning of
the Refugee Act. Id. at 726.
268. Convention, supra note 46; Protocol, supra note 2.
269. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.).




in D- L- & A- M 272 and Zalega,2 7 3 who are from coun-
tries where their persecutors are still in power. To obtain asylum
eligibility, these aliens must satisfy a higher evidentiary burden,
that of showing a well-founded fear of persecution.
By judicially rendering one of the two standards for asylum eligi-
bility ineffective, the Seventh Circuit, as well as other federal cir-
cuits, offers the prospect of asylum only to those aliens who can
show a well-founded fear of persecution. This result is contrary to
that contemplated by the Protocol, the Refugee Act, and the regula-
tions promulgated thereunder. These instruments contemplate and
create two distinct grounds for asylum eligibility.2 74 Moreover, these
instruments make available the safe haven of asylum to aliens who
have suffered severe persecution in the past, even if there is no dan-
ger of persecution were they to return home.275
Where political changes are such that they bring an end to the
formal reign of those at the hands of whom an alien suffered perse-
cution, but leave them a powerful source of influence in the alien's
country, an alien may be unwilling to return home yet unable to
demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution. Moreover, aside
from the informal power which may have been retained by the
alien's former persecutors, an alien may be unwilling to return to his
country of origin for other reasons. The High Commissioner recog-
nized those reasons in the Handbook, noting that a change of re-
gime does not always bring about "a change in the attitude of the
population, nor in view of his past persecution, in the mind of the
refugee. 2 76
In short, an alien may be afraid to return home, despite changed
conditions, because the sentiment of the population toward him,. or
people like him, may not have improved, or because, in his own
mind, the alien fears returning home due to the suffering he endured
there. As noted earlier, the United States Supreme Court in Car-
doza-Fonseca stated that the High Commissioner's comments in the
Handbook provide "significant guidance in construing the Protocol,
272. Interim Dec. No. 3162 (BIA Oct. 16, 1991).
273. 916 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1990).
274. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (discussing the two grounds for asylum
eligibility).
275. See supra notes 82-84, 87 and accompanying text (noting the exceptions to the two stan-
dard grounds for asylum eligibility).
276. HANDBOOK, supra note 64, at 31 cl. 136.
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to which Congress sought to conform. '2 77 Therefore, as the instru-
ments clearly state and as their interpreters recognize, where an
alien has suffered severe persecution, he should not be expected to
repatriate.
Because the Seventh Circuit does not deem even prolonged deten-
tion and severe physical abuse, such as the beatings with a lead pipe
that Chrzascik endured, 7 8 as past persecution sufficient to form the
basis for asylum eligibility, it precludes an alien whose country of
origin has experienced a change in conditions from invoking the hu-
manitarian principle which would make him eligible for asylum. By
demanding a level of persecution above that which any refugee in
the present world could satisfy, as suggested by Judge Posner's posi-
tion in Skalak, the courts violate the humanitarian principle which
rightly applies to those refugees who have suffered severe persecu-
tion in the past, but who no longer have a well-founded fear of per-
secution due to changes in their country of origin.
Both the Protocol and the Refugee Act, together with its regula-
tions, contemplate two distinct grounds for asylum eligibility in ad-
dition to the humanitarian principle. Thus, in order to comply with
the international and domestic obligations of the United States, the
Seventh Circuit, other federal circuits, and the BIA should lower
the level of past persecution required for asylum eligibility for those
who have suffered severe persecution in the past but face little or no
likelihood of persecution in the future. 79
An insurmountable standard for asylum eligibility on the basis of
past persecution will have a detrimental effect in today's rapidly
277. I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 439 n.22 (1986).
278. See supra text accompanying note 219 (discussing the decision in Szczech, and the beat-
ings involved therein).
279. There is increasing popular support for the proposition that aliens are using requests for
asylum as means of gaining entry into the United States. See, e.g., 60 Minutes: How Did He Get
Here? (CBS television broadcast, Mar. 14, 1993) (discussing the reasons associated with Sheik
Rahman's presence in the United States and continued presence even after his alleged association
with the bombing of the World Trade Center). To avoid allowing the past persecution standard to
turn into a revolving door for aliens who lack a well-founded fear of persecution, courts could
insist on the introduction of evidence showing that the persecution the alien suffered was so severe
as to emotionally scar him. In each case, the judge, based upon this evidence, could decide
whether the emotional scar is deep enough such that returning the alien to his country of origin
would be inhumane. Similarly, the Attorney General could adopt regulations under § 208(a) of
the Refugee Act requiring aliens seeking to rely on past persecution as grounds for asylum to
submit evidence showing the effect of past persecution on them. Such evidence could be in the
form of expert testimony or affidavits presented to Immigration Judges and others at the adminis-
trative level along with the asylum application.
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changing world. Many persons who have suffered emotional or phys-
ical abuse on account of their race, religion, nationality, member-
ship in a particular social group, or 'political opinion, may be left
without the safe haven asylum provides. Because of changes in the
aliens' countries of origin, it is unlikely that courts would find them
to have a well-founded fear of persecution. Since it is not likely that
any of these aliens have suffered the kind or severity of persecution
the German Jews suffered at the hands of the Nazis, they cannot
realistically hope to persuade the Seventh Circuit, or other similarly
conservative circuits with respect to this issue, that the past persecu-
tion they have suffered makes them refugees eligible for asylum.2"'
Today, there are many countries undergoing changes of regimes,
governments, and conditions. Under the Protocol and the Refugee
Act it is unacceptable to simply determine whether the persecuted
peoples of those countries will continue to suffer persecution under
the new conditions when evaluating asylum eligibility. The past per-
secution which the aliens from those countries have already suffered
- if severe enough - is sufficient, regardless of changed conditions,
to make them eligible for asylum under the authoritative
instruments.28 1
Certainly, the administrative and judicial bodies of the United
States could follow the Seventh and other circuits282 and raise the
level of persecution required in the absence of a well-founded fear to
a level that no one could satisfy. That, however, was not the intent
of the Committee who drafted the Convention, nor the intent of
Congress when it approved the accession of the United States to the
Protocol and when it subsequently passed the Refugee Act. Con-
trary to the interpretation given to the Refugee Act by the Seventh
Circuit and other federal circuits, the Refugee Act "reflects one of
the oldest themes in America's history - welcoming homeless refu-
gees to our shores. It gives statutory meaning to our national com-
mitment to human rights and humanitarian concerns."28 Sadly, re-
fusing eligibility for asylum to those who were beaten, whose homes
were invaded, and whose liberties were suspended does not reflect
280. See supra notes 226-27, 262-63 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Posner's quote
referring to the experience of Jews in Nazi Germany).
281. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text (discussing the High Commissioner's obser-
vance of the humanitarian principle).
282. See supra notes 141-239 and accompanying text (surveying positions taken by the Seventh
and other circuits).
283. S. Rep. No. 96-256, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1979).
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the "national commitment to human rights and humanitarian con-
cerns"84 that Congress, in passing the Refugee Act, sought to con-
vey and promote.
Thus, the overall impact of the restrictive view of the past perse-
cution standard is two-fold. First, countless peoples who have suf-
fered persecution have been and will be left ineligible for asylum in
the United States. Secondly, the international stature of the United
States as a nation that holds human rights in high regard has been
and will continue to be tarnished. These phenomena will continue
until those interpreting the Refugee Act interpret it consistently
with the intent of its drafters and in accordance with the interna-
tional obligations of the United States under the Protocol.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, it is the alien, the asylum-seeker, the refugee, the per-
son behind the labels, who suffers the most. Without a meaningful
past persecution standard as envisioned by the drafters of the Refu-
gee Act, by the BIA in In re Chen,2 85 and by the United Nations,
that person may face a return to his country of origin. Such a return




285. Interim Dec. No. 3104 (BIA Apr. 25, 1989).
286. Estimates indicate that 30-60 percent of refugees are survivors of torture. Antonio Marti-
nez & Mary Fabri, The Kovler Center: The Dilemma of Revictimization, 2 TORTURE 47 (1992).
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